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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: An independent process evaluation of the
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, whose legislative basis is Title I of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Covering primarily the first 4 years of the COPS
program but including some projections up to 2003, the evaluation, sponsored by NIJ and
conducted by the Urban Institute,
is based on a series of nationwide
telephone surveys, site visits, and
case studies. The evaluation focuses primarily on COPS grants
enabling law enforcement agencies (1) to hire police officers to
engage in community policing activities, and (2) to redeploy existing
officers to community policing by
increasing officer productivity
through the acquisition of technology or by freeing up officers for
community policing by filling some
officer-held positions with civilians.
Key issues: To what extent did
the COPS program succeed in
putting more officers on the street
and, through its promotion of
community policing, change the
practice of policing in the United
States? Did the distribution of
COPS mirror the disparity in crime
levels among jurisdictions? How
satisfied were grantees with the
COPS application and administration processes? Have grantees
engaged in community policing
I I
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The COPS Program After 4 YearsNational Evaluation
by Jeffrey A. Roth and Joseph F. Ryan

Nearly $9 billion of the $30 billion of
expenditures authorized by the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (Crime Act) was allocated to the
law's Title I, the legislative basis of what
soon became known as the Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Title I listed four specific goals
intended to change both the level and
practice of policing in the United States:

1. To increase the number of officers
deployed in American communities.
2. To foster problem solving and interaction with communities by police
officers.
3. To encourage innovation in policing.
4. To develop new technologies for assisting officers in reducing crime and its
consequences.
Over a 6-year period, the approximately
$9 billion was to fund three primary approaches to achieving the foregoing goals.
The first approach involved the award of
3-year grants to law enforcement agencies
for hiring police officers to engage in
community policing activities. The second was to award grants for acquiring
technology, hiring civilians, and, initially,
paying officer overtime-all with the
intent of increasing existing officers'

productivity and redeploying their saved
time to community policing. The third
approach was to award grants to agencies
for innovative programs with special purposes, such as reducing youth gun violence and domestic violence.
The hiring grants were limited to 75 percent of each hired officer's salary and
fringe benefits, normally up to a "3-year
cap" of $75,000. The grants for other
resources were not limited by the cap.
Normally, grantees were required to
match the grants with at least 25 percent
of program costs, to submit acceptable
strategies for implementing community
policing in their jurisdictions, and to
retain the COPS-funded officer positions
using local funds after the 3-year grants
expired. Funds were authorized to reimburse up to $5,000 of training costs for
former military personnel hired under
the Act.
Further, the Act required simplified
application procedures for jurisdictions
with populations of less than 50,000 and
mandated an equal distribution of funds
between jurisdictions with populations
of more than and less than 150,000.
As with most Federal grant programs,
COPS-funded resources were required
to supplement local expenditures, not
supplant or replace them .
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Issues and Findings
continued ...
by building partnerships, solving problems, and doing crime prevention?

Key findings: Among the principal findings of the evaluation are the following:
• By May 1999, 100,500 officers and
equivalents had been funded . Of them,
preliminary estimates indicate that between 84,700 and 89,400 will have been
deployed by 2003. Because some officers
will have departed before others begin
service, the federally funded increase
(based on awards through May 1999) in
policing levels will peak in 2001 between
69,000 and 84,600 before falling to
62,700-83,900 in 2003. These estimates
will be revised as data collected in mid2000 are analyzed. The COPS Office has
continued to award grants since May

1999.
• The program accelerated transitions
to locally defined versions of community
policing. COPS funds seem more likely to
have fueled movements toward adoption

To meet the requirements of Title I,
eight initiatives were undertaken:
l. Within a month after the Crime Act
was signed into law, COPS Phase I
grants for hiring officers were
awarded to agencies that had previously applied unsuccessfully for
grants under the previous Police
Hiring Supplement (PHS) program;
together, COPS Phase I and PHS
funded nearly 4, 700 officers.

2. Also within that month, the
Department of Justice created a
new agency, the COPS Office, to
administer the new grant program.
3. In November, the COPS Office
established two grant programs for
hiring officers: Funding Acceler- f~t{~i1

of community policing that were already
accelerating than to have caused the
acceleration.
• An analysis found that the 1 percent of
COPS grantees with the largest 1997 murder counts received 31 percent of all COPS
funds awarded through 1997. The 10 percent of grantees with the highest murder
counts received 50 percent of total COPS
awards.
• COPS application procedures and
customer service orientation resulted in
many smaller police agencies reporting
high levels of satisfaction with the
program's application and administrative
processes. Larger agencies tended to
find administrative requirements no less
burdensome than those of other grant
programs.
• Building partnerships with communities
by COPS grantees was commonplace in
many of the agencies visited but, all too

ated for Small Towns (COPS FAST),
with simplified application procedures for small agencies; and Accelerated Hiring, Education, and
Deployment (COPS AHEAD), with
more stringent application procedures, for large agencies. Later,
these two programs were succeeded
by the Universal Hiring Program
(UHP) for all jurisdictions regardless of size.
4. Within a few months, the COPS
Office created the Making Officer
Redeployment Effective (COPS
MORE) program to fund technology, civilians, and overtime (the
overtime option was eliminated
after fiscall995).
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often, partnerships were in name only
or simply standard, temporary working
arrangements. Most visited agencies did
some form of problem solving, but form
and visibility varied widely from agency to
agency. In observed sites, crime prevention
efforts abounded, primarily manifested as
traditional programs now subsumed under
the community policing label.
• The COPS program facilitated the
efforts of agency chief executives who
were inclined toward innovation and represented perhaps the largest effort to
bolster development of law enforcement
technology since the 1967 President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice. COPS-funded
technology is benefiting localities but not
yet meeting productivity projections.

Target audience: State and local law
enforcement agencies, State and local government administrators, Federal agencies
and congressional committees involved in
criminal justice issues, and researchers.

5. To process training grants for hired
military personnel, the COPS Office
established the Troops to COPS
program.
6. To address local law enforcement
needs other than new officers and
other resources, the COPS Office
received authorization to administer
the existing Comprehensive Communities Program and created other
grant programs to launch the Police
Corps and to help grantees address
such specific problems as domestic
violence, youth firearms violence,
gangs, methamphetamine, and
school crime.
7. To encourage and assist the policing field in its transition to community policing, the COPS Office
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funded four additional activities:
the Community Policing Consortium to provide training and technical assistance in community
policing; its own Program, Policy
Support, and Evaluation Division to
conduct assessments and evaluations of community policing activities; part of the policing research
program of the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ); and a network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPis), where educators, law
enforcement agencies, and community organizations collaborated in
community policing research, demonstration programs, training, and
technical assistance.

8. To foster compliance with the programmatic requirement to implement community policing and with
all administrative requirements, the
COPS Office undertook an extensive program of information dissemination, training and technical
assistance, telephone contact with
grantees, legal reviews and opinion
letters regarding grantees plans,
and onsite monitoring by the COPS
Office, working in conjunction with
the Office of the Comptroller (OC),
Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice.

The national evaluation
Under its policing research program,
NIJ was asked to administer an independent evaluation of the COPS program; NIJ selected the Urban Institute
(UI) to conduct it. In addition, NIJ
awarded grants to various organizations to evaluate several components
of the COPS program other than the
hiring and COPS MORE programs.
With NIJ's concurrence, the UI team
excluded the innovative programs from
its scope to avoid duplicating other
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evaluators' efforts. The PHS and COPS
Phase I grants were awarded before
all grantmaking innovations were
adopted, and the award processes were
fully completed before this evaluation
began. Therefore, although UI counted
those program resources in its analyses, it did not single out those programs for separate program evaluation
purposes. Finally, because the RCPis
emerged well after the evaluation was
under way and project resources committed, observations of their activities
were limited to incidental findings
onsite rather than a systematic
evaluation.
This Research in Brief presents Ul's
national evaluation findings covering
roughly the first 4 years of COPS,
with primary focus on the COPS
FAST, AHEAD, UHP, and MORE
programs. Our work was guided by the
logic model shown in exhibit 1, which
outlines the COPS program and its
intended effects.
The model indicates that COP · program outcomes depend on local decisions and actions to a greater degr e
than Federal block grant programs
(in which formulas determine funding
allocations) or discretionary programs
(in which Federal officials select
grantees based on detailed plans for
using the funds). Starting from the upper left of the xhihit, distribution of
C P ' resoUl'ces dep o :led OJ'I ligible
ag n ·i s T sponses to a proposed exchange of Federal resources in return
for local financial and programmatic
commitments. The financial commitments were to share the costs of the resources during the life of the grant and
to retain the COPS-funded officer positions thereafter. Grantees' programmatic commitments were to police
their jurisdictions following principles
of community policing.
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As the COPS program was launched,
neither the retention nor the community policing commitment was fully
spelled out at the Federal level. The
retention requirement was not precisely defined until 1998. Consistent
with community policing principles,
grant applicants were required to define the concept locally by submitting
their own strategies specifying how
they would meet four broad objectives-partnership building, problem
solving, prevention, and organizational
support of those objectives-using a
plan tailored to local needs, resources,
and context. Awards to applicants with
inadequate ommuu:ity policing strategies were accompanied hy a special
condition requiring training and technical assistance hy the Community
Policing Consortium.
As shown in exhibit 1, successful applicants were to implement three kinds
of organizational transitions. First,
recipients of hiring grants had to recruj t hiTe train, and deploy an influx
of n w poli. e officers. Second, COPS
MORE grantees were obligated to
a ctuire and implement technology, to
hire civilians, or (under 1995 grants
only) to manage officers' overtime,
ther I y permitting the redeployment of
offi. ers or full-time equivalents (FTEs)
to community policing. Third, to accommodate the demands of community
poli ing, mo l agen j s n ed d to
change U1eir organization · in various
ways-ail explicit obje ' tiv of tb
COPS program.
As shown in the center of exhibit l,
successful local implementation was
to include advancement of three programmatic community policing objectives specified by the COPS Office:
problem solving, building partnerships with the community, and participating in prevention programs. In turn,
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grantees' expanded pursuit of those
objectives affects local criminal justice
agencies and other units of local
government.
The processes described above are the
subjects of this Research in Brief. As
a process evaluation, this study sets
aside questions of community impact,
represented in the shaded sector of the
exhibit: how police and community actions stimulated by the COPS program
affected levels of community satisfaction with police, fear of crime, social
and physical quality of life, levels of
serious crime, etc. More specifically,
this report addresses the seven major
questions noted in the accompanying
sidebar (see "Major Questions Addressed by the National Evaluation"
on page 7).
The answers to those questions were
shaped by the history of the COPS
program and its roots in presidential
politics, academia, policing practice,
and Federal assistance programs to
local law enforcement and criminal
justice agencies. Therefore, before
this report addresses those evaluation
questions, a review of the salient aspects of COPS history and roots is
appropriate.

The COPS program and

its roots
The COPS program can be viewed as
the confluence of two forces. First, the
1992 presidential campaign occurred
when public confidence in the ability
of government to control crime was
low, fear of crime was high, and resistance to Federal budget increases was
even higher. In such a climate, a program to "put 100,000 officers on the
street" made sense, especially if done
with a display of Federal efficiency at
minimal cost.
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Second, over the preceding two decades, some students and practitioners
of policing had begun to develop ideas
that collectively became known as
"community policing." The meaning of
the term was fuzzy-as many believe it
should be because its essence involves
tailoring program specifics to local
needs and resources. Nevertheless, a
consensus was emerging that community policing had five main ingredients: solving underlying problems that
linked seemingly unrelated incidents
of crime and disorder instead of responding to them one by one; deemphasizing routine patrol and rapid
response as primary crimefighting
tools; involving the communities being
policed as partners in identifying
problems and planning or even executing responses; preventing crime
through strategies for socializing children and youth and for making highcrime places safer; and changing
organizations to support the other goals.
From the standpoint of many police
executives, a program that combined
community policing with additional
officers had both positive and negative
aspects. Community policing encouraged police to share crime reduction
responsibilities with other segments
of their jurisdictions. Additional resources are generally seen as useful,
but involving other partners in deciding how to use them can raise sensitive
issues. Similarly, while at the time
"more technology and more civilian
employees" was hardly a politically
viable Federal response to the Nation's
fear and outrage over crime, several
prominent police chiefs and mayors
were arguing that those resources
would be more useful than additional
officers.
For several years, beginning in
the Bush administration, the U.S .
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Department of Justice and other Federal departments had begun to rethink
the mechanisms for distributing
Federal financial assistance. Grant
programs had begun inching toward
bypassing States to deal directly with
local governments, reducing administrative burdens, and lowering categorical boundaries on how funds could be
used. The difficult question was how
to support local priorities in less constraining ways without giving up all
F ederalleverage for shaping those
priorities. Early programmatic steps
in this direction included the Bush
administration's Operation Weed and
Seed and the Clinton administration's
early Project PACT and Comprehensive Communities Program.
These factors challenged the COPS
program with an extremely ambitious
goal: encouraging law enforcement
agencies across the Nation to hire
100,000 officers and to adopt community policing as a guiding philosophy-without raising the Federal
budget deficit. These objectives compete, because burdensome measures
taken to monitor compliance with the
community policing requirement could
diminish the attractiveness of the
grants. Yet failure to monitor compliance raises the danger that a program
intended to increase the number of
agencies doing community policing
may reduce the quality of the community policing they do.
At the urging of several influential
police chiefs who placed higher priority on acquiring technology and hiring
civilians than on hiring new officers,
the COPS MORE program was created
to support these alternative resources.
However, the statute obligated the
COPS Office to require applicants to
demonstrate that the productivity gains
associated with these resources would
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Exhibit 1. Logic Model

RESOURCES AND
REQUIREMENTS

State/Local
• Financial
• Governmental
• Community

Federal
•COPS
• Other programs

OUTCOMES IN
OTHER CJAs

PROGRAM
OUTPUTS
(+)

(-)
Local Decisions
• Apply?
• Accept?
• Resources
• Community
policing plan

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

Partnership Building
• Surveys, meetings
• Citizen councils
• Joint projects
• Community capacity
• Cross-agency collaboration

Hire officers

(+)

Acquire
technology,
civilians

Problem Solving
• Armlysis
• Community input
• Maintenance

Redeploy
officers
orFTEs

(+)
(+)

Reorient Organization
• Community voice
• Officer discretion
• Interagency cooperation
• Capacity for change

Prevention
• Prevention education
• Code/truancy enforcement
• Victim assistance

COPS IMPLEMENTATION

Abbreviations and Symbols:
FTEs : Full Time Equivalents
CJAs: Criminal Justice Agencies
(+):Items listed in preceding box result in positive impact on, or increase in, items listed in the following box.
(-) : Items listed in preceding box result in negative impact on, or decrease in, items listed in the following box.

permit the redeployment of existing
officers to the street at least as costeffectively as hiring grants. Other benefits of civilians or technology were
irrelevant under the statute. Lacking
an experience base for estimating the

productivity gains, most applicants
succeeded in projecting that redeployment would occur cost-effectively.
However, achieving the projected
redeployment became contingent
on grantees' ability to implement

•• •
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technologies that were sometimes unfamiliar and, in the case of one key
technology-wireless transmission of
field reports-essentially unavailable
at the start of the COPS program.
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Senior Justice Department officials
concluded that demonstrating effectiveness of the Federal Government in
this complex mission required a new
organization doing business in new
ways. Therefore, a new Office of Community Oriented Policing Services was
created within weeks after passage of
the Crime Act and quickly became
known as the COPS Office. The new
agency undertook the heroic task of
staffing up, announcing the COPS program to all eligible grantee agencies,
assuring that applications complied
with programmatic requirements, and
making award decisions, all within a
few months.
The COPS Office succeeded in processing more than 10,000 grant awards
in its first 4 months. While the early
rounds of that work were completed
before the national evaluation began,
the design and implementation of the
evaluation relied heavily on COPS
Office manual and automated records.
During that work, evaluators found
that grant files typically showed evidence of fairly thorough eligibility and
programmatic review. The high accuracy levels of COPS Office records
greatly facilitated our work.
COPS grants were not exempt from
standard Department of Justice budget
review and administrative requirements, which are administered by the
OC. For the relatively simple hiring
grants, the combined COPS Office/OC
process required about 7 months on
average from application submission
to signed acceptance of those awards.
During startup, the COPS Office attempted to reduce this delay with an
"accelerated" procedure that permitted agencies to hire officers after
receiving an announcement letter
but before formal obligation of grant

in
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awards; 50 percent of AHEAD grantees and 35 percent of FAST grantees
reported using this procedure. In some
jurisdictions, local rules prevented
agencies from hiring new officers
before the official award.
Formal review and approval of the
more complex COPS MORE grants
required an average of 11 months,
even under normal circumstances.
For many grantees, this delay was
prolonged between October 1995 and
April1996 while a Federal budget dispute shut down OC grant reviews and
left the COPS budget in doubt. Consequently, an average of 16 months
elapsed for 1995 MORE applicants
between application submission and
signed acceptance of the awards.

•••

as simpler than others, as of 1996.
This compared with 40-50 percent
among large agencies, which faced
more elaborate application requirements, especially among MORE
grantees, who had suffered the most
consequences of the Federal budget
confrontation and whose applications
required more elaborate review.

During debates over the 1994 Crime
Act, a Local Law Enforcement Block
Grant (LLEBG) program had been proposed unsuccessfully by Republicans
as an alternative to the COPS program.
After the 1994 elections, the LLEBG
initiative resurfaced and COPS program authorizations were reduced by
about $500 million in the fiscal1996
and subsequent budgets, with the
$500 million reprogrammed to
LLEBG. This reprogramming raised
concerns that LLEBG, with its lower
match requirement of only 10 percent
and fewer restrictions on how funds
could be spent, would reduce localities' interest in COPS grants.

As startup difficulties were surmounted, the COPS Office shifted its
focus to program operations, which
were intended to encourage implementation of community policing and new
technology and to foster compliance
with administrative regulations. The
office expanded the Community Policing Consortium, which the Bureau of
Justice Assistance had created in
1993 to advance community policing,
and created Innovative Community
Oriented Policing programs. Some of
those programs were intended to develop innovative approaches to such
problems as gangs, domestic violence,
and methamphetamine. Others were
intended to advance community policing in special environments, such as
schools and distressed neighborhoods,
to advance problem-solving skills,
and to advance community policing
through supportive organizational innovations. Finally, the COPS-funded
RCPis brought academic, practitioner·,
and community perspectives to bear
on training and local innovation for
community policing.

Despite these difficulties, the COPS
Office "customer satisfaction" orientation succeeded at the outset with small
agencies (i.e., those serving jurisdictions of less than 50,000). Among
small-agency Wave 1 survey respondents with prior Federal grant experience, nearly 80 percent described
COPS application and administration

To foster compliance with administrative regulations, five units were
involved. The COPS Office Legal
Division defined compliance by interpreting Title I, writing regulations,
and applying them to specific local
circumstances. The Grants Division
informed the field about requirements,
reviewed applications for compliance,
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Major Questions Addressed by the National Evaluation
How did local agencies respond to the exchange offered by
the COPS program? The evaluation ad-

dressed this question primarily through
three waves of national telephone surveys. Wave 1 interviewed a representative
sample of law enforcement agencies of
all types and sizes, selected in May 1996
and stratified to overrepresent COPS hiring grantees, MORE grantees, and the
nongrantees that were serving jurisdictions of more than 50,000. Wave 2 interviewed a new sample of agencies whose
first COPS award was a 1996 UHP grant
and reinterviewed members of the Wave
1 MORE subsample with grants for mobile computing technology. Wave 3
reinterviewed the municipal and county
police agencies that were interviewed in
Wave 1 and either (a) belonged to the
Wave 1 nongrantee or hiring grantee
subsamples and served jurisdictions of
more than 50,000, or ( b) belonged to
the Wave 1 MORE subsample regardless
of jurisdiction size. Under subcontract,
the National Opinion Research Corporation collected the Wave 1 data in
October-November 1996, Wave 2 in
September-October 1997, and Wave 3 in
June-July 1998. During June-July 2000,
Wave 4 reinterviewed all agencies interviewed in Wave 1. Additional information
came to light during site visits to 30
grantee agencies, conducted between
early 1996 and 1998 by teams of researchers and police practitioners.
2. What distribution of COPS funds
resulted from localities' application
decisions through the end of 1997?

Analyses of COPS Office grant management databases addressed that question
The analyses were updated several times
between February 1996 and March
1998.

3. How did COPS hiring grantees accomplish their hiring and deployment
objectives through mid-1998, and
what were their expectations for retaining the COPS-funded officers? We

addressed the hiring question primarily
through the Wave 1 survey, the retention
question primarily in the Wave 3 survey,
and gathered supplemental information
on both matters on site visits. The Wave
4 survey updated information on both
issues.
4. How did COPS MORE grantees succeed in acquiring and implementing
technology, hiring civilians, and
achieving the projected redeployment targets through mid-1998? An

analysis of a representative sample of 438
grant files for 1995 MORE awards ascertained what types of technology were
awarded in the first year of the program.
Implementation progress was the primary
focus of the Wave 2 survey of all 183
1995 MORE grantees that received
MORE-funded mobile computers, the
most commonly awarded type of technology. For all types of technology, the
Wave 3 survey updated this information
by asking all respondents about all their
MORE grants, regardless of how the
agency was selected at Wave 1 or when
their MORE grants were awarded.
5. What increases in policing levels
were projected and achieved by local
agencies using COPS resources? Toes-

timate increases through 1998 based on
grants awarded through 1997, surveybased estimates of hiring progress, technology implementation, and retention
expectations were applied to the projections in COPS Office data. As a benchmark, we performed time-series analyses
of 1989-96 data on sworn force size reported in annual Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR).
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For a preliminary estimate of long-term
increases in policing levels due to COPS
hiring and MORE programs, the evaluation applied factors estimated from the
Wave 3 survey to COPS Office grant
award counts as of May 12, 1999, when
the White House announced achievement of the goal of funding 100,000
police officers. We plan to updute this
estimate based on the Wave 4 survey.
6. To what extent had the COPS
program succeeded by mid-1998 in
encouraging grantees to build partnerships with communities, adopt
problem-solving strategies, and participate in prevention programs? To

trace this evolution on a national basis, all
three survey waves contained a checklist
of tactics in support of these objectives.
We compared grantee and nongrantee
agencies' official statements on the extent to which these tactics were in place
before 1995, were begun or expanded
later, and were supported by COPS
funds through mid-1998. Observing the
"ground truth" behind the survey responses was a primary purpose of programmatic site assessments in 30 grantee
agenCieS.
7. To what extent did grantees'
organizations change through 1998
to support and sustain community
policing? We obtained national profiles

of organizational change using the survey
methodology we adopted for programmatic change and observed "ground
truth" during site visits. In addition, the
question was addressed through 10 case
studies conducted under subcontract by
the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and
Management of the Kennedy School of
Government.

Researc

and assigned grant advisors to maintain regular telephone contact. The
Monitoring Division monitored compliance through site visits to 432 grantees
in 1998, with a planned expansion to
900 in 1999. The OC established a
separate branch to monitor compliance
with financial and administrative requirements and to monitor the adequacy of grantees' accounting and
administrative controls. The Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) audited
COPS grantees onsite in search of possible violations of the Title I statute.
Between 1996 and 1998, as the COPS
Office process of awarding grants
yielded some of the center stage to
compliance activities, the satisfaction
of large local/county agencies with
COPS Office operations declined
somewhat. The percentage of hiring
grantees describing COPS grants as
easier than others to administer declined from 63 to 4 7 between 1996
and 1998. Although nearly 90 percent
continued to describe their grant advisors as helpful, the percentage who
found them "easy to reach" dropped
from 81 to 74 percent.

COPS application decisions
This section describes who participated in local decisions to apply, what
considerations weighed in their decisions, and what their future application plans were as of 1998.

Who participated in agencies'
application decisions?
Law enforcement agencies' decisions
to apply for Federal grants are typically a fairly closed process, involving
the chief law enforcement executive,
elected officials or their staffs, and,
in larger agencies, the unit that will
administer the grant and the agency
grant manager, if one exists. Yet
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many believe that community policing
initiatives are more likely to succeed
with broad and deep participation in
planning throughout the agency.
For COPS applications, agencies' chief
executives were reportedly involved in
virtually all decisions and elected officials in more than 80 percent. According to the Wave 1 survey, about half
the agencies brought sergeants into the
application decisions, nearly 40 percent involved patrol officers, and various segments of the community were
brought into 20 to 45 percent of decisions. Less than 25 percent involved
union representatives. Despite COPS
Office success in simplifying application procedures, some 40 percent of
applicants nevertheless involved consultants in the application process.

and the implicit match needed to cover
annual salary and fringe benefits exceeding $33,333 and collateral costs
of an officer, such as training and
equipment-were the most commonly
mentioned reasons given in 1996 by
agencies for their decisions not to
apply in 1995. By mid-1998, concern
over the cost of retaining the officers
after grant expiration was the primary
influence on decisions not to apply,
and this concern also led to an estimated 40 percent of the agency withdrawals. At that time, the nature of the
retention requirement was unclear: the
U.S. Department of Justice had not
announced the length of the required
retention period (one complete budget
cycle after grant expiration), and we
believe the prevailing assumption was
a much longer and more costly period.

Which agencies became
grantees, and why?
An estimated 19,175law enforcement
agencies were eligible for COPS
grants. This estimate was obtained by
merging law enforcement agency lists
maintained by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, the FBI's National Crime
Information Center, the UCR Section,
and the COPS Office. Duplicate records were removed and agencies that
appeared to be ineligible deleted. Of
these agencies, 10,537 (55 percent)
requested and received at least one
COPS grant by the end of 1997. Of
grant recipients, 761, or about 7 percent, had withdrawn by March 1998.

Resistance to community policing was
not a significant deterrent to applying
for COPS grants. Objections to community policing or to Federal grants
in general were mentioned by only
8 percent of respondents. Moreover,
88 percent of the largest agencies in
our sample that had received LLEBG
funds reported that they were using
them to support community policing
even though there was no requirement
to do so. It appears that by covering
collateral costs not covered by COPS
grants, the advent of LLEBG may have
encouraged participation in the COPS
program.

After the COPS startup period, when
short application deadlines and related
local logistical problems discouraged
some agencies from applying immediately, financial considerations became
the primary influence on agencies'
decisions not to apply. Financial concerns during the grant period-the
explicit 25 percent match requirement

What are agencies' future
application plans?
In June-July 1998, the program
remained popular among grantees:
74 percent oflocal/county grantees
stated they were planning to apply for
at least one additional COPS grant in
1998 or 1999, as were 66 percent of
small agencies Uurisdictions of less
than 50,000), 78 percent of medium-
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size agencies (50,001-150,000), and
89 percent of large agencies (150,001
or more). Among the prospective
applicants, MORE technology grants
were resoundingly popular: 20 percent
planned to apply for that type only,
and an additional 41 percent planned
to request MORE-funded technology
in combination with officer hiring,
civilians, or both. The most popular
combination was technology plus
sworn officers (25 percent of prospective applicants). Six percent planned
to apply for hiring grants only, and
3 percent for civilians only.
As with prior application decisions,
financial considerations strongly influence future intentions. Of the large
local/county agencies surveyed in
Wave 3, the local match requirement
was described as "very important" by
55 percent of the agencies, restrictions
on allowable purposes for which grant
funds could be spent by 48 percent,
restrictions on allowable types of resources by 43 percent, and uncovered
collateral costs by 40 percent.

Distribution of COPS funds
This section summarizes the number
and dollar amounts of COPS grant
awards and their distribution pattern.

What is the total value of COPS
grants for increasing the level of
policing?
By the end of 1997, according to
COPS Office records, awards had been
announced of 18,138 grants worth
$3.4 7 billion. Of those, 754 were for
innovative programs. The remaining
17,384 grants were intended to increase the level of policing. They carried a total of $3.388 billion in awards:
about 16 percent under COPS MORE,
and 84 percent under hiring grant programs including PHS and COPS Phase
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I. These programs, plus FAST, AHEAD,
and UHP supported the hiring of
approximately 41,000 officers. COPS
MORE supported the acquisition of
other resources (primarily technology
and civilians) whose productivity was
projected to yield the FTE of approximately 22,400 additional officers for at
least 3 years, for a total of 63,400 officers and equivalents.
By May 12, 1999, according to COPS
Office press releases, another $1.9
billion had been awarded, about 74
percent under hiring grants and the
remainder under MORE. At a ceremony that day, the White House
announced that the goal of funding
100,000 police officers had been
reached. By then, the COPS Office
and its predecessors had awarded an
estimated $4.27 billion in hiring
grants and another $1.017 billion in
MORE grants, for a total of $5.387 billion, exclusive of innovative program
support. These funds supported the
hiring of 60,900 officers and the acquisition of other resources projected
to yield 39,600 FTEs of officer time
through productivity gains.

How were COPS funds
distributed?
Eligible agencies' application decisions led to significant variation by
region, but regional patterns differed
depending on how they were measured. The Pacific region ranked first
in terms of the percentage of eligible
agencies receiving grants but third in
terms of COPS dollars awarded per
capita and sixth in terms of COPS
dollars per crime. The Mid-Atlantic
region ranked eighth in terms of
agency participation but first on both
the per capita and per crime measures.
Of all agencies selected for awards by
the end of 1997, 4 percent served core
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city jurisdictions (i.e., central cities of
Census Bureau Metropolitan Statistical Areas), which are home to 27 percent of the U.S. population. They
received 40 p<~rcent of COPS dollar
awards for all programs combined, and
62 percent of all COPS MORE funds.
On average nationwide, core cities received substantially larger awards per
10,000 residents ($151,631) than did
the rest of the country ($86,504). However, their average award per 1,000
index crimes ($184,980) was less than
two-thirds the average for the rest of
the country ($299,963).

Which types of agencies received
the most COPS grants?
Some 75 percent of hiring and MORE
funds went to municipal or county
police agencies, 15 percent to sheriffs
and State police agencies, and the remainder to a variety of special jurisdictions. As required by Title I, dollars
awarded were about evenly split between jurisdictions with populations of
more than 150,000 and smaller ones.
The growth in awards during 1996 and
1997 was driven largely by repeat
awards to existing grantees rather than
by first awards to new grantees. By the
end of 1997, $1.42 billion, or 4 7 percent of all funds designated for award,
had been allocated to agencies with
four or more grants. As a result, the
distribution of COPS funds became
skewed, so that through 1998 the
1 percent of grantee agencies with the
largest grants had received 41 percent
of grant funds.

Did COPS funds go where the
crime was?
Awards to repeat grantees helped to
focus cumulative COPS awards on
jurisdictions that suffer disproportionately from serious crime. Of the 8,062
UCR contributors that had received
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at least one hiring grant by Decemher
1997 or one MORE grant by June
1998, the 1 percent with the largest
1997 murder counts received 31 percent of all funds awarded through the
end of 1997. They reported 54 percent
of all U.S. murden;. The 10 percent
with the highest murder counts received 50 percent of total COPS
awards. A nearly identical pattern
occurred with respect to robbery.

Officer hiring, deployment,
and retention planning
After the COPS Office announced
awards, OC reviewed and approved
the budget and obligated the Federal
funds. Following OC approval and obligation of the funds, the COPS Ofiice
mailed a formal award package informing grantees of all conditions.
Grantees were allowed to draw down
funds only after they had returned a
signed acceptance of the award and
conditions to the COPS Office. For the
hiring grants, in which conditions were
fairly standard and most OC review
issues involved merely calculation of
salary and fringe benefits, these processes moved fairly smoothly, even
through the Federal budget dispute
and Government shutdown in 199596. During those years, the mean
elapsed time between COPS Office
receipt of the application and mailing
the award package to the grantee was
149-154 days for hiring programs, and
grantees who had returned their signed
acceptances by mid-1997 did so in an
average of 70-75 days, for a total
elapsed time of about 224 days.

How did officer hiring and
deployment proceed?
Onee funds became obligated and
available to spend, hiring of COPSfunded offieers proceeded smoothly
throughout the entire 1996-93
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observation period. In 1996, more than
95 percent of agencies reported hiring
their officers within l0-12 months of
award obligation. As of June 1998,
33 percent of medium and large local!
county grantees reported they had
hired all their officers funded through
the end of 1997. Nearly 70 percent of
them reported that all of their officers
had finished training and begun working in their first regular assignments.
All the agencies reported that they
expected to have 100 percent of their
officers awarded through 1997 on the
street hy June 2000.
As of the 1996 Wave 1 survey, half of
all small-agency (COPS FAST) grantees reported deploying their new officers directly to community policing and
38 percent assigned them to "backfill"
in routine patrol assignments for more
experienced officers redeployed to
community policing. About 68 percent
of medium- and large-agency (COPS
AHEAD) grantees reported using the
backfill strategy, which the COPS
Office recommended.

How are COPS-funded officers
spending their time?
Two of the three prime components
of community policing articulated by
the COPS Office-partnership building and problem solving-were the
most commonly expected uses of
COPS-funded officers' time; eaeh
was mentioned by about 40 pereent of
the medium and large local/county
agencies in the Wave 3 sample. About
26 percent of those agencies reported
their COPS-funded officers would
spend substantial amounts of time on
"quality of life" policing, a style some
believe requires strong control by the
community if it is not to undermine
community partnership building. Routine patrol and "squeezing in proactive
work" were hoth mentioned by around
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30 percent of agencies. The COPSfunded officers were expected to spend
substantial time on routine patrol
by 40 percent of the agencies with
agencywide community policing and
by 24 percent of agencies with specialized community policing units. Some
23 percent of the agencies reported
their COPS-funded officers would
spend at least some of their time on
undercover and tactical assignments,
and 35 percent expeded them to
spend at least some time on administrative or technical assignments.
As an indirect measure of COPSfunded officers' activities, we asked
how those activities were affecting
other agencies. Among the large local/
county grantees, B3 percent reported
greater demands on code enforcement
and sanitation agencies; 33 percent reported greater demands on community
organizations and businesses; and 66
percent reported greater demands on
agencies that deal with violence in the
home. These impacts are consistent
with direct reports of strong emphasis
on problem solving ami partnership
building, along with referrals of domestic violence cases.

How were agencies planning
to retain the COPS-funded
officers as of 1998?
Through the 3-year hiring grant perimls, 98 percent of respondents reported they had either kept their
COPS-funded officers on staff or replaced departed officers expeditiously.
At the time of the Wave 3 survey in
1998, our sample contained few agencies with expired grants. Therefore,
findings are limited to plans and
expectations regmding retention, not
actual retention experience.
The Wave 3 survey was conducted
before the COPS Office announeed the
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length of grantees' retention commitment: compliance with the retention
requirement requires keeping grantfunded officer positions filled using local funds for at least one budget cycle
beyond grant expiration. Despite the
uncertainty, approximately 66 percent
of Wave 3 respondents reported they
were "certain" their agencies would
retain the COPS-funded officers when
their grants expired. Another 24 percent indicated they were "almost positive" they would retain the officers;
6 percent were "pretty sure"; only 4
percent stated they were "not sure at
all."
Next, respondents were asked whether
they agreed or disagreed with a series
of statements intended to describe in
more detail their expectations about
how their agencies would retain the
COPS-funded officers. About 95 percent reported that the COPS-funded
officers either were or would be part of
the agency's base budget by the time
the grant expired. About 52 percent
stated they were uncertain about longterm retention plans. Only 10 percent
of the respondents reported that despite the "good faith effort" required
as a grant condition, unforeseen conditions were likely to keep their agencies
from retaining all of the positions.
Other common responses are diffi cult
to interpret and suggest that despite
extensive COPS Office efforts to educate agencies about the retention requirement, the persons authorized to
speak to our interviewers on behalf of
the agencies may have been uncertain
about what the requirement entailed.
About 37 percent reported expecting
that the COPS-funded officers would
be retained by "using positions that
open up" (i.e., through attrition, indieating an intention to retain the COPSfunded officers but not the positions).
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About 20 percent reported expecting
that the COPS-funded officers would
be retained by cutting back positions
elsewhere, a plan that would constitute
supplanting under many common
conditions; 5 percent agreed that the
COPS-funded officers were likely to be
retained both through attrition and by
cutbacks elsewhere. Now that theretention requirement has been spelled
out in more detail, we are reexamining
long-term retention plans in the Wave
4 survey.

MORE awards and projected
productivity gains
COPS MORE was a pivotal component
of the COPS program. From the
administration's perspective, MORE
was key because it accounted for 39
percent of the 100,000-officer total but
only 19 percent of the COPS budget.
From the grantees' perspective,
MORE-funded resources, especially
technology, were extremely attractive
because they promised a variety of
local benefits without the burden of
postgrant retention costs that new officers carried. This section describes
what is being acquired with COPS
MORE awards, how implementation
of MORE-funded technology and
achievement of productivity gains is
proceeding, and how MORE-funded
civilians are being integrated into
grantee agencies.
How are COPS MORE funds
being allocated and used?
COPS MORE has been especially
popular with large jurisdictions, and
awards have been more heavily concentrated than hiring grant awards in
relatively few agencies. Of the 17
agencies serving populations of more
than 1 million, 53 percent had received at least one COPS MORE grant
by the end of 1998, compared with just
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5 percent of agencies serving populations less than 25,000. By the end of
1997, the 1 percent of grantees with
the largest MORE grants had received
48 percent of the $528 million awarded to that point, compared with 37 percent for the largest hiring grantees.
The concentration of large MORE
grants was even greater among local/
county police agencies, and it increased slightly during 1998.
In 1996, the General Accounting Office reported that technology absorbed
just over half of 1995 COPS MORE
resources, civilians somewhat less,
and overtime less than 10 percent.
Overtime was not supported by COPS
MORE after that year. By 1998, 38
percent of MORE grantees had been
funded exclusively for technology,
another 44 percent for both technology
and civilians, and 5 percent for technology, civilians, and overtime.
What is the relationship between
COPS MORE grants and counts of
officers?
To receive a MORE grant, an applicant had to produce a credible projection that the funded resources would
yi eld at least four FTEs in increased
productivity per $100,000 of grant
funds-the rate at which Federal
COPS funds supported officer hiring.
On average, in a random sample of
1995 MORE grant applications, civilians were projected to yield 4.54 FTEs
per $ 100,000, largely through replacement of officers on a one-for-one basis.
Technology projections averaged 6.12
FTEs per $100,000
Starting in 1996, the COPS Office
began converting dollars from
MORE technology grants to projected
FTEs at the four-per-$100,000 minimum needed to demonstrate costeffectiveness-a more conservative
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assumption than applicants' projections. The conservative projections
were used in COPS Office estimates of
total FTEs funded and were the standard of accountability imposed on
grantees. Even under the conservative
assumption, technology accounts for
64 percent of total productivity gains
projected for COPS MORE.

Implementation of MORE-funded
technology
Starting with the budget review and
funding obligation process, COPS
MORE technology implementation was
problematic. Because of the additional
complexity of COPS MORE plans and
budgets, Federal processing of applications required at least 4 months
longer than hiring grants. For 1996
applicants, the average time between
receiving a MORE application at the
COPS Office and mailing the award
package to the grantee was 269 days,
compared with 149 days for hiring
programs.
Between October 1995 and April
1996, the MORE award process was
stretched out even further by a Federal
budget confrontation. A Government
shutdown halted OC review of 1995
applications in the pipeline. Also, uncertainty over the fiscal1996 COPS
Office budget delayed award decisions
on applications received just before
the September 30 end of fiscal1995,
which had pushed the total requests
for fiscal1995 beyond available
MORE resources. As a result, successful1995 MORE applicants waited an
average of 16 months between submitting their applications and receiving
authority to draw down funds.
What types of technology were
acquired and what redeployment
was projected? At the time of our
Wave 1 survey in 1996, few agencies
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had received more than one MORE
grant, and so most local/county MORE
technology grantees were pursuing
only one type of technology. By far the
most common was mobile computers,
being implemented by an estimated 60
percent of these agencies, followed by
management/administrative computers
(23 percent) and booking/arraignment
technology (10 percent). Some agencies were pursuing telephone reporting
systems (2 percent), Computer Aided
Dispatch (CAD) systems (1 percent),
and other technologies such as geomapping and reverse 911 systems.
By 1998, many MORE agencies were
implementing more than one type of
technology. Therefore, the percentage
of agencies implementing each technology type had grown to 79 percent
for mobile computers, to 45 percent for
management/administrative computers, to 12 percent for CAD systems
and booking/arraignment technology,
and to 6 percent for telephone reporting systems. The 1996-98 changes
make clear that most CAD and telephone reporting system projects were
begun more recently than most mobile
and management/administrative computer projects.
Although automated COPS Office
records do not allow one to attribute
projected ITEs to specific technologies, it was possible to compute the
number of FTEs for categories of
MORE technology grantees based on
their combinations of funded technologies. These computations suggest that
the mobile computers were projected
to play an important role in increasing
productivity. Of 16,870 projected
FTEs funded through June 1998,
34 percent were generated by agencies
with mobile computers only, and
29 percent by agencies with a combination of mobile computers, manage-
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ment/administrative computers, and
other technologies. Only 24 percent
were projected to come from agencies
without mobile computers.
The knowledge base from which MORE
applicants could develop their projections of FTEs saved through productivity gains was sparse. For most of the
technologies, projections clustered
around 2.4 hours per officer per shift,
slightly more than the 2 hours used by
the COPS Office as an example in the
MORE application kit.
How rapidly is implementation
proceeding? Technology implementation was far from complete as of
summer 1998, even by agencies whose
first COPS MORE grant was awarded
under the 1995 program. Among
those agencies, 61 percent reported
that management/administrative computers were fully operational, as did
4 7 percent for telephone reporting
systems, 45 percent for booking/arraignment systems, 44 percent for
mobile computers, 39 percent for CAD
systems, and 65 percent for other technologies. For computing technologies,
implementation has proceeded most
rapidly among small agencies: 50 percent of agencies serving jurisdictions
of less than 50,000 have all mobile
computers operational, compared with
23 percent of agencies with jurisdictions of more than 150,000. For management/administrative computers,
the comparable percentages are
78 percent and 53 percent.

Some management/administrative and
mobile computers were not operational
simply because they were purchased
not long before the Wave 3 survey.
Nevertheless, for two reasons these figures probably understate the adverse
effect of delays in mobile computer
implementation on achievement of
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projected productivity increases.
First, CAD and telephone system
projects began, on average, under
more recent grants than computer
implementation. Second, the one available time study indicates that any projected mobile computer productivity
increases will be due to wireless field
reporting, which eliminates trips to
stations to write reports-not from
wireless inquiry functions applicable
to driver's license, vehicle registration,
and other files. The inquiry capability
produces benefits such as improved
officer safety, elimination of waits for
clear voice-radio channels, and protection from scanners but are unlikely
to save measurable officer time that
can be redeployed to community policing. Yet, to our knowledge, as of June
1999, no major police department has
achieved departmentwide implementation of wireless field reporting, although three are reportedly in the final
phases of testing. Therefore, all the
agencies that reported they had operational mobile computers were referring
to inquiry capability, not wireless field
reporting.

What productivity gains are
being achieved and reallocated
to community policing?
Because of the delays in technology
implementation, the 1998 Wave 3 survey offers only a fragmentary basis for
comparing actual productivity gains
with those projected in MORE grant
applications. As of June 1998, MORE
grantees from 1995 expected to achieve only about 49 percent of the projected FTEs, but the Wave 3 sample
was not designed to produce a definitive national estimate. The estimate of
productivity gains will be updated in a
future report based on the Wave 4 survey in 2000, when more grantees are
expected to have experience with fully
operational technology.
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What other benefits and costs of
technology are local agencies
experiencing?
Although prospects for achieving 100
percent of the projected productivity
gains are not encouraging at this time,
agencies report expecting or achieving
a variety of other benefits from their
mobile computers, even without wireless transmission capability. These
include:
• Automated.field reporting: more
complete, accurate, and recent
real-time information and permanent records; improved crime/data
analysis capability; more accurate/
complete/timely records; improved
spelling/grammar/legibility; more
report writing; easier retrieval of
information; shorter review process;
and reduced time for records staff.
• Wireless query and response
functions: improved officer safety
due to faster, more secure responses
to queries regarding license plates,
vehicle registrations, and persons;
secure car-to-car communication;
and fewer demands on dispatchers.
• Increased effectiveness: higher
clearance and conviction rates due
to improved reports; better recovery
of stolen property; positive response
from the community (though some
report adverse reactions from victims and witnesses); more information sharing across shifts; better
communications with neighboring
agencies; better tracking of community events; easier provision of information to the public; and better
preparation for court.
• Agency benefits: opportunity for
staff to learn computers; officer
morale booster (sometimes after a
break-in period); and expected
financial savings in the long run.
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Agencies also experienced extra costs
due to the new technology. The most
common were computer staff time, system installation time, and time to train
personnel in the use of the technologies. Time incurred by computer staff
and/or vendors was an especially common expense in agencies with ongoing
technology projects that MOREfunded technology had to fit. Some
agencies that anticipated the costs
included them in their initial grant
budgets without sacrificing the costeffectiveness of their MORE programs.
Depending on technology type, 23 to
27 percent of MORE technology grantees implementing the five most common technology categories reported
that unexpected implementation costs
increased the local cost of their MORE
grants by at least 10 percent over the
match they had originally planned.
Not surprisingly, the likelihood of an
agency experiencing unexpected costs
increased as implementation progressed. The percentage reporting
unexpected costs rose from 21 percent
of agencies with mobile computers not
fully implemented to 31 percent of
agencies that had completed implementation. The percentage reporting
unexpected costs rose from 22 percent
to 29 percent for agencies implementing desktop computers, from 26 percent to 43 percent for CAD systems,
from 3 percent to 60 percent for
automated booking systems, and from
12 percent to 32 percent for telephone-reporting systems.
Three categories of cost have been
especially problematic for agencies
funded for mobile computers, especially those pursuing wireless field
reporting. These are upgraded telecommunications capacity; integration
of field reporting with existing (or
developing) records management
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systems; and vehicle mounts, which
were frequently designed from scratch .

Use of MORE-funded civilians
This section describes the functions
being performed by MORE-funded
civilians, civilian hiring and retention,
and deployment of the officers replaced by the new civilians.
How did hiring, deployment, and
retention of civilians proceed?
During 1995, the first year of COPS
MORE, the program awarded $145
million to fund civilians to create
6,506 FTEs of sworn officer time.
By June 1998, this amount had risen
to $287.2 million to support 12,975
FTEs. At that time, more than 80 percent of grantee agencies reported having completed their civilian hiring,
and all expected to complete their civilian hiring by the end of 1999. Sixtyfour percent of grantees reported that
all their civilian hires were still on
staff, and 80 percent of the remainder
reported that they had replaced all
who had left. An estimated 96 percent
reported that the civilians were saving
officer Lime, and, for the four most
common civilian positions, 73 to 80
percent of agencies reported that their
new civilians had been used either to
create a new position or to increase the
total number of people in each position.
The MORE civilian program appears
to have provided modest encouragement Lo an ongoing Lrend toward
c:ivilianization. Approximately 45 percent of MORE civilian grant recipients
claimed to be already in the process
of civilianization when they received
their grants. The annual average increase in civilians between 1993 and
1997 (which span the early COPS
years) was 4 percent, up from 3 percent annually over the preceding
:1 years.
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What functions are the MOREfunded civilians performing?
MORE-funded civilians were hired to
increase resources for community policing in four ways:

I. Shedding routine tasks from sworn
officers to civilians, such as clerical/administrative positions (e.g.,
typing, filing, scheduling duty rosters, taking phone messages) and
record maintenance.
2. Replacing sworn personnel in existing specialist positions, such as
desk/duty officers, dispatchers,
telephone reporting unit staff, and
evidence technicians.
3. Filling new or existing specialist
positions that are expected to improve officer productivity, such as
computer technicians.
4. Staffing new community policing
positions, such as community coordinators/organizers, domestic violence specialists, or CPTED (Crime
Prevention Through Environmental
Design) planners.
The most common assignments of
MORE-funded civilians were to clerical/administrative positions (43 percent of agencies assigned at least some
civilians to such positions), dispatchers (34 percent), and telephone response unit members (26 percent).

COPS effects on policing levels
The effect of the COPS program on
policing levels is the total of the two
components discussed in the preceding sections. The first is sworn officers
hired through COPS grants and retained after the grants expire. The second is productivity gains, measured in
officer FTEs yielded by MORE-funded
resources. This report contains preliminary estimates of both effects,
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which should be treated with caution
for several reasons. First, anticipating
the Wave 4 survey, we did not design
Wave 3 to survey a representative
sample of small local/county agencies
or, indeed, any samples of other types
of agencies. Second, Wave 3 data were
collected at a time when grantees had
little actual experience on which to
base estimates of two key factors in the
projections: the percentage of hired
officers that will be retained following
the required period and the actual
number of FTEs generated from resources acquired with COPS MORE
grants. The Wave 4 survey and other
data will be used to produce updated,
more valid, estimates.
With these cautions in mind, we report
estimates of COPS program impacts
as of two points in time: the impact,
through the end of 1998, of grants
awarded through 1997; and the longterm impact of grants awarded through
May 12, 1999, the date the White
House announced that the goal of funding 100,000 officers had been met.

How will COPS hiring grants
affect the number of law
enforcement officers in the
United States?
Wave 3 survey data were first used to
estimate the number of COPS-funded
officers hired as of June 1998.
Through 1997, the COPS Office had
awarded hiring grants for 41,000 officers; survey results indicate that about
39,000 of them had been hired. The
difference reflects grantee delays in
accepting awards, recruiting candidates, and hiring officers.
This gross increase is partially offset
hy delays in filling vacancies for nonCOPS positions, and cross-hiring
between agencies. Allowing for these
factors, we estimate that the 41,000
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officers awarded by the COPS Office
as of the end of 1997 resulted in anational net increase of between 36,300
and 37,500 officers by the end of
1998.
In the longer term , offsetting factors
include certain federally approved
cuts in sworn force size and less-thancomplete retention of COPS-funded
positions beyond the 3-year grant period. Given the uncertainty surrounding these factors, a best case scenario
would have grantees retain 91 percent
of their new hires indefinitely, and a
worst case scenario would result in a
64 percent retention rate.
By May 1999, the COPS Office had
awarded agencies approximately
60,900 officers through hiring grants.
Under the best case scenario, these
awards will proCiuce an estimated peak
effect of 57,200 officers by the year
2001 and, after postgrant attrition, the
permanent effect of the grants will stabilize at an estimated 55,400 officers
by 2003. The minimum retention
scenario, in contrast, suggests that the
net impact of these awards will peak at
48,900 oificers in 2000 but decline to
a permanent level of 39,000 by 2003.

How will COPS MORE grants
affect the number of FTE
officers redeployed through
increased productivity?
Estimates of time savings from MORE
grants were based on the Wave 3 survey, which contained a representative
sample of 1995 municipal and county
MORE grantees. To develop preliminary national estimates, we extrapolated the results of these agencies to
other types of agencies and later cohorts of MORE grantees.
By the summer of 1998, the COPS
Office had awarded agencies 22,400
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FTEs through MORE grants for civilians and technology, and survey
results indicate that grantees had
redeployed 6,400 FTEs with these
grants. At that time, however, only
23 to 78 percent of MORE technology
grantees (depending on agency population category and type of technology)
described some or all components of
their technology as fully operational.
Therefore, grantees were also asked to
estimate future productivity increases
they expected to achieve once all
grants were fully implemented.
Agencies that had progressed the furthest in making their technology operational projected productivity gains
that were smaller (60 percent of the
original projections) than those expected by MORE grantees as a whole
(72 percent of the original projections),
suggesting that agencies adjust their
expected productivity gains downward
as they gain more experience with operational technology.
We used those figures to compute best
case and worst case interim estimates
but recognize the worst: case estimates
are based on only a partial subsample
that has substantial implementation
experience. This subsample is growing
and becoming more representative
over time, and so revisions of estimates of MORE-supported productivity increases are plmmed in 2000
using Wave 4 survey data.
Using these assumptions and an estimated 3-year timeframe for full implementation by grantees, we estimate
that by the end of 1998, between
9,100 and 10,900 officers were redeployed from resources funded by
MORE grants awarded by the end of
1997. If these implementation patterns
hold for post-1998 MORE grants, the
39,600 FTEs awarded as of May 1999
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will result in the redeployment of
between 23,800 and 28,500 FTEs
by 2002.

What will be the combined
effect of hiring and MORE
grants awarded by May 1999
on the level of policing?
By May 1999, the COPS Office had
awarded approximately 100,500 officers and officer equivalents through
hiring grants and MORE grants. Our
estimates for the two types of grants
are combined in exhibit 2. Upper
bound projections based on June 1998
survey estimates of maximum officer
retention and maximum officer redeployment suggest that these awards
will result in a peak national net
increase of 84,600 officers and equivalents by the year 2001, before declining somewhat and stabilizing at a
permanent level of 83,900 by 2003.
Lower bound projections based on estimates of minimum officer retention
and minimum officer redeployment
suggest that the COPS-supported increase in the number of officers and
FTEs deployed at any point in time
will peak at 69,000 officers in the year
2001 and decline to a permanent level
of 62,700 by 2003.
Total COPS-funded FTEs added to
police agencies throughout this period
will be greater than the number available during any [JUrlieular year, especially if our lower bound projections
prove more accurate. In this regard,
the COPS program might be compared
with an "open house" event, in which
the total number of visitors to the
event is larger than the number
present at any given point in time.
Using this open house concept, we
estimate that COPS awards made
through May 1999 will result in the
temporary or permanent hiring of
60,900 offieers and the deployment
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of between 23,800 and 28,500 ITEs,
thereby adding between 84,700 and
89,400 FTEs to the Nation's police
agencies at some point between 1994
and 2003, though not all these ITEs
will be simultaneously in service at
any single point in time.
Whether the program will ever increase the number of officers and
equivalents to 100,000 on the street at
a single point in time is not clear. The
COPS Office has continued to award
COPS grants since May 1999. If the
agency continues to award hiring and
MORE grants in the same proportions
and our upper bound projections are
correct, roughly 19,000 additional
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officers and equivalents awarded could
be enough to eventually produce an
indefinite increase of 100,000 officers
on the street. If the lower bound assumptions are more accurate, the program may require an additional 59,000
officers and equivalents awarded to
create a lasting increase of 100,000 officers. More definitive answers to these
questions will be available following
completion of the Wave 4 survey in
2000.

COPS and the style of
American policing
The COPS Office listed four principal
goals of community policing: building
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police-community partnerships, problem solving, crime prevention, and
organizational support for these programmatic objectives. The evaluation
used three approaches to observe how
the COPS program affected law enforcement agencies' pursuit of these
goals. First, at three points in time, the
national survey of agencies measured
agency representatives' official statements about the implementation status
in COPS grantee and nongrantee agencies of 4 7 tactics for pursuing these
objectives, as well as the role of COPS
funds in grantees' implementation of
those tactics. Second, teams of police
practitioners and researchers visited
30 sites, many twice, for programmatic

Exhibit 2. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing
Awards Through December 31, 1997

Awards Through May 12, 1999

Officers Hired and
FTEs Redeployed

Program
Hiring
(PHS, COPS
Phase I, FAST,
AHEAD, UHP)

MORE

Total

t

Funded (12/97)
(1)

Gross (6/98)
(2)

41,000

39,000

22,4oot

+

63,400

6,400

Estimated Net Hired
or Redeployed

Net (12/98)
(3)

Funded

(4)

Year

(5)

36,300-37,500

60,900

High
2001
2003+

:57,200
:55,400

Low
2000
2003+

:48,900
:39,000

High
2002+

: 28,500

Low
2002+

: 23,800

High
2001
2003+

:84,600
:83,900

Low
2001
2003+

: 69,000
: 62,700

9,100-10,900

45,400

39,600

45,400-48,400

100,500

Projection

Net of 3,600 second- and third-year supplements for retaining civilians, which are included in COPS Office records of 26,000 FTEs funded.

+As of June 1998.
+Indicates "steady rate" projection , e.g., 2003+ indicates "for year 2003 and beyond."
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site assessments of the "ground truth"
underlying agencies' statements about
the tactics in use. Third, to explore the
roles of local leadership and COPS
resources in facilitating community
policing innovations, 10 case studies
were conducted by a Kennedy School
of Government team.

Has the COPS program
advanced the adoption of
community policing in the
United States?
The answer is "yes," but it must be
quickly qualified. "Adoption of community policing" has very different
meanings in different jurisdictions,
and COPS funds seem more likely to
have fueled movements that were already accelerating than to have caused
the acceleration.
Between 1995 and 1998, the use of a
number of tactics commonly labeled as
community policing swept the country
among grantees and nongrantees.
Among those that reportedly spread
the fastest were citizen police academies; cooperative truancy programs
with schools; structured problem
solving along the lines of SARA
(Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment); and patrolling on foot, bike,
or other transportation modes that offered more potential than patrol cars
for interacting with citizens. Grantees
and nongrantees alike reported revising their employee evaluation measures and their mission, vision, and
values statements to codify their versions of community policing. Packaged
prevention programs became almost
universal by 1998, such as Neighborhood Watch and drug resistance education in schools, which in 1995 were
already among the most widespread
tactics commonly described as community policing.
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We have no measure of the extent to
which the COPS program played various roles that may have indirectly encom·aged nongrantees to adopt these
tactics. Possible mechanisms included
training and technical assistance
programs and materials, publicizing
grantees' community policing successes, and acting as a catalyst that
encouraged grantees to demand more
community policing training from regional and State academies.
The advancement of community policing among nongrantees offers some
weak evidence that the COPS program
provided fuel but not the launch pad
for the nationwide proliferation of
community policing tactics between
1995 and 1998.
With a few exceptions, COPS grantees'
reported use of community policing
tactics grew more rapidly than did
nongrantees'. However, the difference
in reported adoption rates was statistically significant for relatively few.
They include joint crime prevention
projects with businesses, citizen surveys, techniques for bringing the
community more fully into problem
solving, and bringing probation officers into problem-solving initiatives.
Grantees were significantly more
likely than nongrantees to report
adopting late-night recreation programs and victim assistance programs.
Finally, grantees were significantly
more likely than nongrantees to
report instituting three organizational
changes in support of community policing: new dispatch rules to increase
officers' time in their beats, new rules
to increase beat officers' discretion,
and revised employee evaluation
measures.
In this information age, the community
policing vocabulary is well known.
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Federal funding rewards departments
that profess the successful implementation of community policing principles. In that context, survey findings
that agencies' use of community policing tactics grew between 1995 and
1998 could merely reflect socially desirable responses , at least for COPS
grantees. Our site visits were intended
to learn the ground truth behind the
survey reports and to shed light on the
different meanings that law enforcement agencies assign to strategies and
tactics that are commonly labeled as
community policing. Given the limited
time on site, one might expect it to be
difficult to separate the rhetoric of
community policing from the reality
of what law enforcement agencies actually do. Indeed, it often was. Therefore, the enormous variation detected
across sites in the operational meanings of key community policing
concepts is especially telling.
This variation is described next.

How are COPS grantees
building partnerships with
communities?
Problem-solving partnerships for coordinating the appropriate application of
a variety of resources are commonplace in many of the agencies visited.
Yet all too often, partnerships are in
name only, or simply standard, temporary working arrangements. Partnerships with other law enforcement units
and agencies merely to launch shortterm crackdowns are not in the spirit
of problem solving or partnerships nor
are partnerships in which citizens and
business representatives are merely
"involved," serving primarily as extra
eyes and ears as before. True community partnerships, involving sharing
power and decisionmaking, are rare at
this time, found in only a few of the
flagship departments. Other jurisdictions have begun to lay foundations for
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true partnerships, however, and as
problem-solving partnerships mature
and evolve, the trust needed for power
sharing and joint decisionmaking may
emerge.

How are COPS grantees
implementing problem solving?
Certainly, it appeared onsite that the
majority of agencies visited are engaged in problem solving, although its
form and visibility vary widely from
agency to agency. Some of the strongest features of problem solving that
evaluators observed included: the evolution of problem solving from "special
operations" to more complex activities
that attack disorder and fear and require police to search for interventions
other than arrest; administrative systems that recognize problem solving
at multiple scales and multiple
levels within the organizations;
broadly distributed authority to initiate
problem-solving "projects"; systems to
assess the impact of particular projects
and to learn from them; and the ability
of the law enforcement agency to engage other government agencies in defining and solving community
problems.
In some jurisdictions, traditional enforcement and investigative activities
are called problem solving under the
community policing umbrella when
these activities are directed toward
problems the community has identified
as eoneerns. Problem-solving projects
dominated by enforcement actions,
however, rarely advance the objectives
of community policing, in that they
are unlikely to either fix underlying
causes or attract the community support needed to maintain solutions.
Therefore, enforcement-based solutions to stubborn problems are likely
to be short term, although when sue-
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cessful, they sometimes encourage
residents to reenter public spaces and
begin developing more permanent
solutions.
A visible sign of enforcement-based
problem solving is the recent and
growing trend toward zero-tolerance
policing, a term also lacking consensual definition. In the sites visited,
zero tolerance policies take different
forms. Some are manifested as zero
tolerance efforts of short duration (e.g.,
operated for a few clays each quarter or
once a year) with a narrow focus (e.g.,
street drug dealing or public drinking
on the July 4) and within a circumscribed area (e.g., high-trafficking area
or downtown). In other jurisdictions,
zero tolerance is less focused. What
might have been called a crackdown
5 years ago is now implemented under
zero tolerance or order maintenance
policies and classified as part of community policing.
Zero tolerance policies have been
included by some agencies under
community policing, since they often
focus on quality of life crimes and incivilities, and primarily because "the
community wants it." Zero tolerance
policies may help achieve some goals
of community policing within a framework that uses community input in setting priorities and delegates discretion
to officers working under mission
statements that value the dignity of
citizens, even suspected offenders.
However, there are dangers that without adequate mechanisms for the
diverse communities within most jurisdictions to register their demand for or
opposition to zero tolerance tactics,
those tactics may directly undercut the
objective of partnership building by
alienating potential community partners.
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How are COPS grantees
implementing crime prevention?
Prevention efforts abounded in observed sites, primarily manifested as
traditional prevention programs now
subsumed under the community
policing label. Neighborhood Watch,
D.A.R.E.®, and a wide variety of youth
programs remain the mainstays of prevention efforts. Beyond the standardized programs, examples were rare of
systemic prevention efforts based on
the resolution of the underlying causes
of crime.
What legacy will remain from
community policing initiatives
stimulated or facilitated with
COPS funds?
There are shining stars among the
COPS grantees that provide examples
of what most observers would classify
as "the best of community policing."
There are far more agencies striving to
change their organizations to pursue
community policing objectives and are
somewhere on the long and tortuous
road. A few want nothing to do with it.
The national survey and site visit results indicate that COPS funding has
helped to accelerate the adoption and
broaden the definition of "community
policing." The effects of this massive
support for community policing has
both positive and negative aspects.
Certainly, COPS funding has enabled
a great number of law enforcement
agencies to move ahead in their implementation of community policing as
locally defined. Funding conditioned
expressly on community policing
implementation, coupled with peer
pressure to embrace this model of policing, has also led a substantial number of law enforcement agencies to
stretch the definition of community
polieing to include under its semantic
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umbrella traditional quick-fix enforcement, draconian varieties of zero tolerance, long-established prevention
programs, and citizen advisory councils that are only advisory.
Our supplemental study of multiple
funding streams in large grantee agencies hinted at the power of local decisions to determine the course of the
community policing movement. Of the
100 largest grantee agencies in the national sample, 88 reported using their
LLEBG funds to augment COPS and
local funding of community policing,
despite the absence of any requirement to do so. However, 82 of the 100
agreed or strongly agreed that their
"agency has a clear vision and is able
to interpret grant requirements to support that view."
Given the power of local decisionmakers, the COPS program will almost
certainly wind up affecting the nature
of policing in three ways. In some jurisdictions, the forces fueled by COPS
grants will achieve the community
policing objectives articulated by the
COPS Office. In others, local forces
will transform the objectives into
something unrecognizable by forebears
and creators of the program. In still
others the forces will fizzle out for reasons that have to do with leadership,
implementation strategies, turnover
at top levels, organizational processes
within grantee agencies, and communities' capacities and willingness to
join the enterprise.
Precisely where each of these outcomes occurs will not he known for
some years. However, change seems
most likely to he institutionalized and
sustained when: planning for change
is broad based; the commitment to
change is rooted throughout the senior
leadership of the agency and the po-
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liticalleadership of the jurisdiction;
changes are organizationwide rather
than limited to a special unit; organizational changes become embodied in
new physical plant or technology; the
new programmatic objectives are reflected in administrative systems (e.g.,
for personnel administration or performance measurement); and the change
redefines the culture of a department,
or at least of an entire age or rank
cohort within the department.

Measures of success
Readers of an evaluation report are
entitled to the clearest possible answer
to the question "Did the program succeed?" In the case of COPS, the clarity
of the answer depends on the criterion
for success. At least the following success criteria warrant attention:
• Client satisfaction.
• Effect on the quantity or level of
policing in the United States.
• Effect on agencies' transitions to
community policing.
• Effectiveness in stimulating
technological and organizational
innovation.
• Effect on crime.
Client satisfaction
If one considers grantees the clients
of a Federal grant program, the COPS
Office one-page application and customer service orientation largely succeeded with law enforcement agencies
serving small jurisdictions (i.e., those
serving populations of less than
50,000). For many of those agencies,
COPS was their first Federal grant experience and they reported high levels
of satisfaction with the application
and administration processes; small
agencies with prior Federal grant
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experience found COPS grants easier
than others to request and administer.
Larger agencies tended to find administrative burdens no less burdensome
than other grant programs, but a number of innovative departments combined COPS funds with other funding
streams to support their community
policing initiatives.
Simplification had one unfortunate
consequence. By avoiding tedious
explanations, the grant application kits
failed to resolve ambiguity in two key
administrative requirements: retention
of COPS-funded officer positions and
nonsupplanting of local fiscal effort. At
least a few jurisdictions failed to apply
because of their overly conservative
interpretations. Other jurisdictions
adopted more aggressive interpretations. Determining the compliance
status of some of those required several years for OIG audits, COPS Office
appeals of audit findings, and independent mediation to resolve disagreements between OIG and the COPS
Office regarding compliance status.
Effect on level of policing
Our best estimate at this time is that
by 2003, awards through May 1999
will have raised the level of policing
on the street by the equivalent of
62,700 to 83,900 full-time officers.
This estimate contains two elements:
39,000-55,400 hired officers (net of
attrition and cross-hiring between
agencies), and 23,800-28,500 fulltime equivalents (FTEs) of officer time
created by productivity gains due to
technology and civilians acquired
with COPS MORE funds. To those
who considered the level of policing in
1994 inadequate, this constitutes success, even though it falls well short of
the target of "100,000 new cops on
the heat."

•

Researc

Even though we plan to update andrefine these estimates after the Wave 4
survey, the actual increase is unlikely
ever to be known precisely, for several
reasons. First, if the optimal number of
police officers in a jurisdiction is related to local conditions, such as crime
rates or tax receipts, then the benchmark against which the COPS-funded
increase is counted should shift when
conditions change. Second, only about
half the COPS MORE grantees have
systems in place to measure productivity gains, and because the measurement requires before-and-after
comparisons, it is already too late to
put measurement systems in place.
Third, even where measurement systems are in place, they are likely to
understate the productivity gains because some of it occurs in very small
increments of time, which officers may
well forget to record.
Effect on transitions to
community policing
It seems clear that the COPS program accelerated transitions to locally
defined versions of community policing in at least three ways. First, by
stimulating a national conversation
about community policing and providing training and technical assistance,
the COPS program made it difficult for
a chief executive seeking professional
recognition to avoid considering adopting some approach that could plausibly be labeled "community policing."
Second, the COPS hiring funds and innovative policing grants allowed chief
executives who were so inclined to
add new community policing programs
without immediately cutting back
other programs, increasing response
time, or suffering other adverse
consequences. Third, the COPS funds
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created an incentive for agency executives to adopt community policing.
Whether, in accelerating transitions to
community policing, the COPS program distmted or watered down the
concept is difficult to say. Tautologically, more replications of any strategy
that encourages tailoring to local conditions will stimulate deviations from
one specific definition of that strategy.
In addition, two policing strategies
burst onto the national scene during
the life of COPS but apparently independently of it: zero tolerance and
COMPSTAT (computer comparison
statistics), the New York City Police
Department's system for increasing
commanders' accountability. Although
the obligation of COPS grantees to
pursue community policing may have
encouraged some police executives to
describe those strategies as "community policing because the community
wants it," it seems at least plausible
that use of those techniques would
have proliferated even if there had
been no COPS program.
Effects on organizational and
technological innovation
In agencies whose chief executives
were inclined toward innovation, the
COPS program facilitated their efforts
in several ways. First, the broad semantic umbrella offered by the term
"community policing" creates latitude
for experimentation with new policing
tactics and organizational structures.
Second, the application required
specification of a community policing
strategy, thereby offering an occasion
for engaging broad segments of the
agency and community in planning
that strategy. Third, COPS resources
allowed departments the opportunity to
add new modes of policing without
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drawing resources away from existing
priorities. Fourth, although achieving
the projected productivity increases
from MORE-funded mobile computers
required telecommunications and
other technology that was unavailable
at the outset of COPS, the MORE
funds fueled a large enough market to
attract vendors' interest and to stimulate their efforts to satisfy the new
demand. This represented perhaps the
largest effort to bolster development
of law enforcement technology since
the recommendations of the 1967
President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of
Justice.
Effects on crime
As a process evaluation, this study did
not address the question of whether
the COPS program had an effect on
crime. Indeed, that question could not
have been seriously addressed in the
early years of COPS because "the
COPS program" meant something
different in each jurisdiction.
However, the adoption of new policing
tactics by so many agencies as they
expanded their sworn forces does
present an opportunity to investigate
which tactics (or clusters of tactics)
had beneficial effects on crime rates.
By statistically relating local crime
trends to the adoption of new tactics,
it should be possible to identify promising strategies that were more likely
than not to reduce crime more rapidly
than the national average. Once promising strategies or tactics are identified
statistically, semistructured site observations should help to identify the
qualitative aspects of implementation
that distinguish effective from ineffective uses of these promising strategies.
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improve criminal justice.
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•

Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency.
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1994 (the Crime Act), partnerships with other Federal agencies and private foundations, advances in technology, and a new
international focus. Examples of these new initiatives include:
Exploring key issues in community policing, violence against women, violence within the family, sentencing reforms,
and specialized courts such as drug courts.
Developing dual-use technologies to support national defense and local law enforcement needs.
Establishing four regional National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Centers and a Border Research and
Technology Center.
Strengthening NIJ's links with the international community through participation in the United Nations network of
criminological institutes, the U.N. Criminal Justice Information Network, and the NIJ International Center.
•

Improving the online capability of NIJ's criminal justice information clearinghouse.

•

Establishing the ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program-formerly the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF)
program-to increase the number of drug-testing sites and study drug-related crime.

The Institute Director establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the
Department of Justice, and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice
professionals and researchers in the continuing search for answers that inform public policymaking in crime and justice.

To find out more about the National Institute of Justice,
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Rockville, MD 20849-6000
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